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1. Introduction 
 
Having gone out of fashion in the early 1970s with the introduction of flexible exchange rates 
and the growth of international capital markets, since the 1990s more interest has once again 
been shown in international reserves. This is, in part, because it is observed that many 
countries have accumulated large levels of reserves. Indeed, reserve accumulation has been 
globally widespread. In an attempt to explain this phenomenon, various studies have 
empirically investigated reserve behaviour; e.g. Aizenman and Marion (2004), IMF World 
Economic Outlook (2003). In the main, these have built on a reasonably well established 
theory of the demand for international reserves; e.g. Clark (1970), Frankel and Jovanovic 
(1981).  
 
The studies suggest that up until the latter part of the 1990s the accumulation of reserves was 
largely consistent with conventional models.  Beyond this time, however, the models 
generally under-predicted the demand for reserves. The challenge has been to explain this 
under-prediction. 
 
Various suggestions have been put forward. One is the rise of a new mercantilism. A second 
is the response to the East Asian crisis in 1997/98, with countries seeking to self-insure 
against future crises. A third is the response to IMF involvement and conditionality, with 
countries seeking to effectively substitute out of future IMF arrangements. A fourth is that 
countries want to retain access to capital markets, and creditworthiness is positively 
associated with reserve levels. In particular, these explanations have been offered in the 
context of Asia, where the excess reserve accumulation was identified as being pronounced. 
 
In what follows we investigate these issues empirically. How widely has the tendency to 
accumulate reserves been seen? Does the incidence of a currency crisis increase the 
subsequent demand for reserves? Do countries make choices between different combinations 
of exchange rate regime and reserve holding? Does an arrangement with the IMF encourage 
countries subsequently to build up reserves more than they otherwise would have done? Do 
different patterns emerge depending upon the measure of reserves used? 
 
In addition to these questions, we revisit and test a much older theory of the demand for 
international reserves. Machlup (1966) argued that the behaviour of monetary authorities with 
regards reserve accumulation was very much like that of his wife with regards her wardrobe. 
Irrespective of how many clothes she possessed, Machlup observed her tendency to add to her 
stock of them year upon year. This became known as the Mrs. Machlup’s Wardrobe Theory 
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of International Reserves. We test whether monetary authorities during the 1990s exhibited a 
Mrs. Machlup syndrome. 
 
2. Empirical Analysis 
 
The data come from the World Development indicators (WDI), the Ivanova et al. (2003) 
database and Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). They include all countries reported in WDI for 
which reserves data (excluding gold) are available. The frequency is annual and covers the 
period 1992-2001. Throughout the econometric analysis we use five measures of reserve 
adequacy:2 reserves in current US dollars divided by the US deflator (RESUSDEF); reserves 
to GDP (RESGDP); reserves to M2 (RESM2); reserves to external debt (RESDEBT); and 
reserves in months of imports (RESMIMP). We also examine a sub-sample of countries 
classified as ‘emerging’ by FTSE.3  
 
During our sample period the demand for reserves increased substantially, a picture 
confirmed in Figure 1. For example, average reserves rose from 10.9 percent of GDP in 1992 
to 15.9 by 2001. A similar pattern can be identified in other measures. In this section, we 
model demand behaviour using static and dynamic panel data estimations. 
 
First, we estimate a specification of the form4 
 
ittiitit xy Z-MED  ' , 
 
where itx'  is a vector of explanatory variables including logged population, logged real GDP 
per capita, logged domestic interest rate, logged ratio of imports to GDP, the current account 
balance (percent of GDP), the ‘coarse’ classification of the exchange rate regime of Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2004), a crisis dummy and an IMF dummy. The first of these dummies takes a 
value 1 for all country observations following a ‘crisis event’, where a (country-specific) 
crisis observation is produced whenever an exchange rate value exceeds the average plus 1.5 
                                                 
2 See Aizenman and Marion, 2001. 
3 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, 
Taiwan, Thailand and Turkey. 
4   Levin et al. (2002) and Im et al. (2003) panel unit root tests of the logged series provide evidence 
that the series are stationary. These tables and descriptive statistics are available from the authors. 
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times the standard deviation of the country’s exchange rate series.5 The second dummy takes 
a value 1 for all country observations following the beginning of an IMF program recorded in 
the Ivanova et al. (2003) database. 
 
The results in tables 1 and 2 indicate that: first, the current account balance is positively 
associated with demand for reserves. This result, however, does not hold for emerging 
economies. Second, less flexible exchange rate regimes are associated with higher reserve 
holdings across the board. Third, the IMF experience seems to have a significant effect on 
accumulation of reserves in the world sample. In the emerging economies’ sample, however, 
the IMF effect is only apparent when examining reserves in relation to debt. For this sub-
group, crises (irrespective of the IMF’s involvement) exert a significant effect on subsequent 
reserve behaviour.6 Fourth, even though the domestic interest rate is not significant in the 
world sample, it is significant and positive in the emerging sample. In these economies, 
financial liberalization led to an increase in interest rates, which attracted capital inflows. The 
authorities did not want the exchange rate to appreciate so intervened in the FX market and 
accumulated reserves. A fifth result is that despite the high explanatory power of the 
specifications, the time effects have been shifting upwards.7 
  
Next, we examine the ‘persistence’ of international reserve hoarding. Our model is 
 
itiititit xyy ZMEU   '1 , 
 
and includes the lagged dependent variable in the RHS. Tables 3 and 4 show GMM 
estimation results for the two samples. Controlling for persistence affects the significance of 
some of the variables. More specifically, the IMF variable does not have any explanatory 
power (with the exception of one regression). The effect of crises remains but only in the 
world sample. There is still evidence for the importance of the current account and the 
exchange rate regime. The persistence term is significantly positive in all individual 
regressions. The domestic interest rate continues to have a significant positive effect. 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 This definition of a crisis has been used in several studies in the literature. For a review see Chui and 
Gai (2005). 
 
6 The two dummies have a low degree of correlation of about 21 percent. 
  
7 The reserves-to-external-debt ratio is the exception to this trend. 
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3. Conclusions 
 
Reserve behaviour during the 1990s can only in part be explained by determinants found in 
conventional models. Our results imply that reserve accumulation may also have been 
positively associated with the incidence of crises. A crisis encourages countries to build up 
reserves more than they would otherwise have done, perhaps not only as a way of minimizing 
the risk of future crises, but also as a way of dealing with crises should they occur. 
 
Additionally, having had a program with the IMF, countries are generally encouraged to 
accumulate reserves to a greater extent than conventional determinants would suggest, 
implying that they attach a higher cost than they anticipated to IMF conditionality. These 
relationships, however, show a tendency to vary with the sample and with the measure of 
reserves used. 
 
We also find significant support for the Mrs. Machlup’s Wardrobe Theory. Time exerts a 
significant positive impact on reserve accumulation. We do not seek to explain this formally, 
but perhaps monetary authorities perceived the period covered by our study as one of 
increasing financial turbulence and potential vulnerability, irrespective of whether crises 
actually occurred. They may also have experienced a change in their preferences over time 
towards income stability as opposed to income level. The question remains unanswered as to 
whether the time effect will endure. It may be that we are picking up a process of gradual 
‘stock’ adjustment which will cease once reserves, as perceived by monetary authorities, 
reach an optimal level. 
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Table 1: Static panel with country and time effects –  
All economies 
 
 LRESUSDEF LRESGDP LRESDEBT LRESM2 LRESMIMP 
LOG(POP) 
 
1.35*** 0.38 3.64*** -0.14 0.74** 
(0.32) (0.30) (0.77) (0.72) (0.32) 
LOG(DIR) 
 
-0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.05 0.02 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) 
LOG(IM_GDP) -0.25*** 0.14* 0.01 0.07 -0.63*** 
(0.09) (0.07) (0.15) (0.15) (0.12) 
LOG(RGDP_PC) 
 
0.86*** -0.37** 0.74*** -1.04*** -0.41*** 
(0.18) (0.16) (0.24) (0.36) (0.15) 
CRISIS_EFFECT 
 
0.14 0.30 0.08 0.60*** 0.23 
(0.20) (0.19) (0.24) (0.14) (0.13) 
IMF_EFFECT 
 
0.30*** 0.31*** 0.36*** 0.13** 0.23 
(0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.07) (0.06) 
CA_GDP 
 
0.01*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.02 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
EXRR2 
 
-0.07*** -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.04*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
C -5.91 -1.63 -60.06*** 8.44 -5.30 
(5.54) (5.03) (13.90) (14.16) (6.19) 
Obs. 1045 1045 748 921 1039 
Panels 121 121 88 108 120 
Period 1992-01 1992-01 1992-01 1992-01 1992-01 
R-sq. 0.96 0.8 0.84 0.9 0.81 
Notes: Estimation with least squares dummy variables and cross-country, time-varying fixed 
effects. Standard errors and covariance are White cross-section. 
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Table 2: Static panel with country and time effects –  
Emerging economies 
 
 LRESUSDEF LRESGDP LRESDEBT LRESM2 LRESMIMP 
LOG(POP) 
 
-0.01 -0.75 -1.34 -1.95 -1.04 
(0.78) (0.76) (1.22)* (1.23) (0.90) 
LOG(DIR) 
 
0.11** 0.12* 0.11* -0.03 0.12** 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
LOG(IM_GDP) 0.13 0.53* 0.12 0.33* -0.43*** 
(0.12) (0.15) (0.21) (0.18) (0.14) 
LOG(RGDP_PC) 
 
1.41*** -0.01 1.45* 0.07 0.42 
(0.42) (0.35) (0.45) (0.34) (0.36) 
CRISIS_EFFECT 
 
0.35** 0.43* 0.18 0.36* 0.31*** 
(0.15) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) 
IMF_EFFECT 
 
0.10 0.15 0.35** 0.16 0.18 
(0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.13) (0.15) 
CA_GDP 
 
-0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
EXRR2 
 
-0.16*** -0.15*** -0.19*** -0.09*** -0.12*** 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
C 11.93 13.70 15.32 31.40 17.66 
(16.38) (16.17) (23.69) (-1.95) (18.66) 
Obs. 199 199 17 199 199 
Panels 21 21 19 21 21 
Period 1992-01 1992-01 1992-01 1992-01 1992-01 
R-sq. 0.9 0.86 0.83 0.84 0.81 
Notes: Estimation with least squares dummy variables and cross-country, time-varying fixed 
effects. Standard errors and covariance are White cross-section. 
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Table 3: Dynamic Panel –  
All economies 
 
 LRESUSDEF LRESGDP LRESDEBT LRESM2 LRESMIMP 
Lag Dependent  0.32*** 0.31*** 0.59*** 0.46*** 0.21*** 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
LOG(POP) 
 
0.97*** 0.03 0.84** -0.36 -0.24 
(0.35) (0.36) (0.37) (0.29) (0.36) 
LOG(DIR) 
 
0.12*** 0.09*** 0.19*** 0.06 0.07** 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
LOG(IM_GDP) -0.18 0.18 -0.03 0.02 -0.74*** 
(0.13) (0.12) (0.15) (0.08) (0.11) 
LOG(RGDP_PC) 
 
0.88*** -0.12 -0.34 0.21 0.03 
(0.21) (0.23) (0.26) (0.20) (0.23) 
CRISIS_EFFECT 
 
0.56*** 1.25*** 0.61*** 0.78*** 1.55*** 
(0.14) (0.24) (0.20) (0.17) (0.24) 
IMF_EFFECT 
 
0.26** 0.07 -0.03 0.06 0.00 
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.13) 
CA_GDP 
 
0.00 0.01** 0.00 0.01** 0.01*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
EXRR2 
 
-0.09*** -0.05 -0.16*** 0.02 -0.04 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Obs. 922 920 657 810 907 
Panels 120 120 87 106 119 
Period 1992-01 1992-01 1992-01 1992-01 1992-01 
Notes: Panel generalised method of moments with cross section fixed effects (White period 
standard errors and covariance). Method of transformation: first differences.  
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Table 4: Dynamic Panel –  
Emerging economies 
 
 LRESUSDEF LRESGDP LRESDEBT LRESM2 LRESMIMP 
Lag Dependent  0.28*** 0.32*** 0.48** 0.14** 0.48*** 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.26) (0.07) (0.12) 
LOG(POP) 
 
0.78 -0.52 -2.15 -1.30 -0.42 
(2.52) (3.66) (4.00) (1.39) (2.85) 
LOG(DIR) 
 
0.10** 0.05 0.12** 0.01 0.02 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) 
LOG(IM_GDP) 0.22 0.55 0.75 0.61** 0.02 
(0.60) (0.51) (0.79) (0.25) (0.36) 
LOG(RGDP_PC) 
 
1.45 0.95 0.28 0.30 0.20 
(1.31) (1.41) (1.66) (0.50) (1.24) 
CRISIS_EFFECT 
 
0.69** 0.08 0.03 0.88 0.31*** 
(0.27) (0.35) (0.15) (0.32) (0.23) 
IMF_EFFECT 
 
-0.02 -0.02 0.08 -0.02 0.05 
(0.12) (0.20) (0.22) (0.11) (0.15) 
CA_GDP 
 
-0.00 0.02 0.04** 0.01 0.03 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
EXRR2 
 
-0.20** -0.10 -0.33*** -0.11 -0.04*** 
(0.08) (0.07) (0.12) (0.04) (0.04) 
Obs. 178 178 157 178 178 
Panels 21 21 19 21 21 
Period 1992-01 1992-01 1992-01 1992-01 1992-01 
Notes: Panel generalised method of moments with cross section fixed effects (White period 
standard errors and covariance). Method of transformation: first differences.  
 
 
 
